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As an emerging discipline, neuroeconomics faces considerable method-
ological and practical challenges. In this paper, I suggest that these
challenges can be understood by exploring the similarities and dissimilarities
between the emergence of neuroeconomics and the emergence of cognitive
and computational neuroscience two decades ago. From these parallels,
I suggest the major challenge facing theory formation in the neural
and behavioural sciences is that of being under-constrained by data,
making a detailed understanding of physical implementation necessary
for theory construction in neuroeconomics. Rather than following a top-
down strategy, neuroeconomists should be pragmatic in the use of available
data from animal models, information regarding neural pathways and
projections, computational models of neural function, functional imaging
and behavioural data. By providing convergent evidence across multiple
levels of organization, neuroeconomics will have its most promising
prospects of success.
Many neuroscientists incorporating economic theory and methods
into their research would find the intuitions behind Stanley Jevons’s
attempt of 1879 to root economics in the materialist psychophysiology
of his day surprisingly familiar (Jevons 1871, Maas 2005). Based on
psychophysical attempts to discover quantitative laws of sensation,
Jevons’s unflinchingly materialist programme of a “mechanics of utility
and self-interest” bear a striking resemblance to the same research
traditions that led to both modern neuroscience and to the contemporary
project of discovering the neural mechanisms underlying economic
behaviour. It may not be too great an overstatement to note that in one
direction an application of the Fechner–Weber law led to the notion of
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diminishing marginal utility while in the other direction it led to modern
neuroscience in the union of visual psychophysics and neurophysiology
(Kuffler 1953, Hubel and Wiesel 1959). Whatever intriguing parallels there
may have been between the historical roots of neoclassical economics
and modern neuroscience, however, these fundamentally diverged when
economics took its “Paretian turn” (Bruni and Sugden 2007). Pareto’s
attempt to eliminate all psychological notions from the foundation of
economics, replacing laws of sensation with ones regarding abstract choice
or “logical action”, later completed by Hicks, Samuelson and others in
the theory of revealed preference, ultimately made economics a separate,
autonomous and thus supposedly irreducible domain of inquiry.
As this volume illustrates, a century and a quarter after Jevons’s
Theory of Political Economy, a nascent neuroeconomics is seeking to re-
ground economic behaviour in the current-best materialist understanding
of human behaviour, cognitive neuroscience. Given the structure of
neoclassical economics and its core methodological commitments, it
is not surprising that this project has generated considerable debate,
commentary and critique. While many of these stem from the question of
how neuroeconomics stands in relation to neoclassical economics, others
are the inevitable consequence of new interdisciplinary enterprises, as
distinct disciplinary practices, methods, and standards come into contact
and require integration.
The debates and controversies neuroeconomics has sparked strike me
as reminiscent of those in an earlier episode in the neural and behavioural
sciences, one that occurred approximately 20 years ago. In what follows,
I want to explore the similarities – and dissimilarities – between this
intellectual episode and the emergence of neuroeconomics, as a sort of
historical case study, which I believe can shed light on the current state of
neuroeconomics, its prospects and its challenges.
THE EMERGENCE OF COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE
The episode I have in mind is the emergence of cognitive and
computational neuroscience from cognitive science, beginning in the early
to mid-1980s. Before doing so, it is necessary to recap the broadest
contours of cognitive science and its methodological commitments. The
foundations of cognitive science were formed in the 1950s as cognitive
psychologists (e.g. George Miller, Jerome Bruner), artificial intelligence and
computer scientists (e.g. John McCarthy, Marvin Minsky) and linguists
(e.g. Noam Chomsky) reacted against behaviourism by positing that
the mind was a physical symbol processor. According to this view,
the mind’s operations could be characterized at an abstract level of
description, the semantic and algorithmic, which in turn could map
onto multiple physical implementations, later codified as a functionalist
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approach to mind (Putnam 1975). So construed, the semantic level of
description, under which cognition was understood as the manipulation
of symbols with propositional content according to the principle of
rationality, was an autonomous level of description (Pylyshyn 1984).
The reason for the autonomy of this level of description was in the
claim that there were generalizations at the semantic level (in terms of
propositional attitudes such as beliefs) for which there was no unitary
physical-level description. As a consequence, cognitive science was
argued to be irreducible to the physical sciences. In particular, since the
semantic level of description could be implemented in different substrates,
neural-level evidence seemed largely irrelevant to the explanation of
mind.
While cognitive science was a productive research programme, it was
not without limitations, some of which in retrospect were fundamental.
For example, its research strategy of mapping cognitive tasks onto
computational models proved to be severely under-constrained. For
any set of behavioural data (e.g. a working memory task) there were
many behaviourally equivalent computational models. The problem of
model selection was compounded by the fact that the entire class of
models being utilized incorporated unrealistic assumptions, such as
unbounded resources, which in turn were justified on the basis of
distinctions, such as performance/competence in linguistics, that struck
many as problematic. By the mid-1980s, this functionalist cognitive science
began to be challenged by a group of researchers in connectionism or
parallel distributed processing (Rumelhart and McClelland 1986). These
researchers challenged the autonomy of cognitive science from the physical
sciences, and particularly cognitive science’s central claim that the level
of implementation was irrelevant to the explanation of cognition and
behaviour. In particular, connectionism embraced a model of computation
that had its roots in the perceptron linear classifiers of Rosenblatt (1958)
and others. Whereas neural network research had been unpopular due to
the computational limitations (Minsky and Papert 1969) explored for the
case of Rosenblatt’s single-layer perceptrons (and incorrectly conjectured
would hold for more complex networks), the discovery, or re-discovery
as the history is complex (Werbos 1994), of the back-propagation learning
algorithm created tremendous excitement over the prospect of ‘brain-like’
computation.
Beginning around 1986, there was a dramatic realignment of research
in the neural and behavioural sciences. The reasons for this are complex,
but a few key points are worth highlighting here. First, neural computation
provided important explanatory links between the high-level symbolic
explanations of cognitive psychology and the low-level, mechanistic
explanations of neuroscience. Thus, psychologists working in areas as
diverse as visual psychophysics, memory, and learning were drawn to
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these modelling efforts as a way to constrain explanation. This led,
ultimately, to cognitive neuroscience, which has in a remarkably short
time become the standard approach to cognition (Gazzaniga 2004). In
the other direction, neuroscience had amassed a tremendous amount of
data regarding single neurons, from the dynamics of single ion channels
and receptors using patch clamp techniques to the level of receptive
field properties, but had few techniques or methods to integrate this
information into theories of neural circuit function, large-scale theories
of brain function, or even detailed models of single-neuron processing,
such as dendritic integration. Computational modelling offered a way to
integrate this information into such large-scale theories, and was thus
rapidly integrated into neuroscience, in fact, creating a new sub-field of
computational or theoretical neuroscience (Dayan and Abbott 2001).
THE CRITIQUE FROM WITHIN: NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS’
REACTION TO NEUROECONOMICS
As an outsider looking into the debate within economics, many of the
debates between what I will refer to loosely as mainstream economics
and the proponents of neuroeconomics strike me as deeply reminiscent
of those between cognitive science and connectionism. For example, the
proponents of “mindless” economics (Gul and Pesendorfer 2008) charge
neuroeconomists with making a category mistake by supposing that neural
evidence could in principle be relevant to economics, as they “address
different types of empirical evidence”.
A similar argument was made by cognitive scientists against the
relevance of neural evidence by claiming that neural and symbolic levels
of description were autonomous, so any attempt to constrain one level
of description by evidence from another amounted to a conceptual
confusion (Pylyshyn 1984). As a graduate student during the 1980s
working on the relationship between cognitive and neural development, I
can recall psychologists looking quizzically at my suggestion that cognitive
processes described as learning could participate in the construction of
the neural circuits underlying that learning (Quartz and Sejnowski 1997).
One pointed out that the suggestion was a non-starter, as Chomsky had
stipulated an a priori “stationarity” principle making this impossible.
Many of the claims made by proponents of mindless economics regarding
the autonomy of economics have the same flavour of the Chomskyian
whose commitments to model-theoretic principles are so severe that they
rule out entire domains of potential empirical support or disconfirmation.
Indeed, it is hard to otherwise understand how Gul and Pesendorfer
(2008) could make the claim that “neuroscience evidence cannot refute
economic models because the latter make no assumptions and draw no
conclusions about the physiology of the brain” other than by invoking
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a strong autonomy thesis. While economic theory may make no explicit
assumptions about the physiology of the brain, it is not the case that
it makes no predictions that could either be confirmed or disconfirmed
by neuroscience. For example, financial decision theory specifies the
minimal parameters necessary for rational choice under uncertainty,
expected reward and risk as variance of reward (Markowitz 1952).
While financial decision theory makes no explicit predictions regarding
neural correlates of these parameters, it does by implication make the
testable prediction that neural activity will correlate separately with
these two parameters given the appropriate task. A possible rejoinder
is the claim that the theory does not make such a prediction since
the function of theory is not to postulate terms that may or may not
correspond to entities in the world, but rather to provide as if explanations
whose sufficiency is determined by instrumental considerations, such
as predictive capacity (Friedman 1953). While a consideration of realist
vs. instrumentalist conceptions of economic methodology is beyond the
scope of this paper (Lagueux 1994), it is worth noting that instrumentalist
interpretations of the symbolic level of cognitive science (Dennett 1987)
are generally regarded as failed programmes, which may lack internal
coherence (Baker 1989). Furthermore, while an instrumentalist may deny
that a correspondence (or lack thereof) between theoretical terms and
real-world entities is the proper measure of a theory, the issue of
such correspondence is nonetheless still an empirical one that may be
tested.
In a recent study, we investigated this issue and found that brain
activation in human striatum correlated with reward and risk and were
differentiated both spatially and temporally and arose in the absence of
learning, motivation or salience confounds (Preuschoff et al. 2006). To us, it
was striking that the implicit predictions of financial decision theory were
confirmed in neural activity. There was no a priori reason why this should
be the case, and such a confirmation strengthens the theory beyond that
provided by an as if instrumentalism.
The more general point I want to make is that the autonomy thesis of
cognitive science proved to be a major barrier to progress in that field.
It created a methodological isolationism within cognitive science that
resulted in its failure to incorporate neuroscience into its approach, even
though the case for such integration should have been clear. The result was
not only that its theories remained highly under-constrained and it lacked
a means to adjudicate among multiple equivalent theories, but it created an
intellectual inflexibility that ultimately led to its obsolescence. If there is a
cautionary tale for mindless economics contained in this historical episode
it is that strong autonomy claims often lead to methodological isolationism
and inflexibility, particularly in the face of growing methodological
alternatives.
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It may be worth noting that one reason for this methodological
isolationism is often the perception that the integration of evidence
from another field will be primarily disconfirming. Connectionists
presented their models primarily in this disconfirming mode. In particular,
connectionists argued that the syntactic transformations that cognitive
science supposed were the core operations of a symbol system (a finite
set of syntactic transformation rules applied to a finite set of symbols
is essentially the definition of a grammar and language of thought,
respectively) would be eliminated in a connectionist scheme (Rumelhart
and McClelland 1986). While this claim may have been an important
part of the revolutionary fervor of connectionism, in retrospect it was a
relatively minor element of the programme with increasing links between
connectionist models and semantic levels of representation (Rogers and
McClelland 2004). Had cognitive science been more methodologically
pragmatic, it likely could have absorbed these new developments rather
than being displaced. Much neuroeconomics is likewise presented as
primarily disconfirming to mainstream economics. Whether this will in
fact be the case remains to be seen.
NEUROECONOMICS WITHIN NEUROSCIENCE
As the lead papers illustrate, a major driving force in the formation
of neuroeconomics has been by behavioural economists looking to
neuroscience to inform and constrain economic theory. In some respects,
this accords with a similar trajectory of cognitive psychologists toward
integrating neuroscience over the last few decades, who increasingly
looked to neural constraints on behavioural data. However, another
driving force that is relatively unexplored in the lead papers is in the
other direction, namely from neuroscientists, who are eager to incorporate
portions of economic theory into neuroscience. In many respects, the
integration of economics into neuroscience is a natural extension of
the incorporation of computational models into neuroscience in the late
1980s. In particular, a result of that integration was a major shift in how
neuroscientists think about the brain and the organization of behaviour
more generally. In cognitive science, the dominant view of the mind was
as an abstract symbol processor, whose state transformations coincided
with cognition as exemplified in such capacities as language production
and problem-solving. The more basic view that minds/brains evolved
as systems to navigate environments according to satisfying needs, that
is, to find reward and avoid punishment, was marginalized in cognitive
science. This was probably due to the fact that cognitive science grew
out of a rejection of behaviourism, as exemplified in Chomsky’s review
of Skinner’s Verbal Behavior (Chomsky 1959). To this day, discussions
of reward learning and conditioning are still often met by cognitive
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psychologists suspiciously as attempts to reintroduce behaviourist notions
that had, according to the view, been dismissed long ago.
Within neuroscience, however, by the early 1990s computational
accounts of reinforcement learning provided the theoretical insights
necessary to develop a novel approach to the function of a key neural
system that until then had been intensively studied but poorly understood.
Specifically, the midbrain dopamine system, a collection of small clusters
of cells that project widely to the cortex, had long been implicated in
reward, motivated behaviour and addiction, but the specific functional
role of this system remained a mystery (Koob and Swerdlow 1988). In
part, this was due to the fact that, unlike many other neural systems,
the projections of this system were diffuse and non-specific, making it
problematic to know how such a system could be involved in anything
more than altering a relatively global feature of neural processing, such as
gain. The temporal difference model of reinforcement learning required
such a signal to broadcast a valuation signal for reward learning (Sutton
and Barto 1998). As this model was applied to the mammalian midbrain
dopamine system and to homologous systems in insects, it demonstrated
that these reinforcement learning algorithms were computationally more
powerful than behaviourist ones, bringing about an important shift in
thinking about the centrality of reward processing to neural systems
(Montague et al. 1995, 1996). This was central to a rapid growth of
interest among neuroscientists more generally in the area of neural
valuation.
The interest in valuation also led to a growing interest among
neuroscientists in the role of emotion in neural processing, as emotions
are typically regarded in neuroscience as reflective of reward processing,
which in turn led to the growing appreciation of the role of emotions
in decision-making. This was seen most strikingly in the neuroscience
literature of the time in neurological patients whose impairment in
emotional processing was accompanied by major changes in their decision-
making and social interaction, which helped spawn a growing social
neuroscience (Damasio 1994). As this work progressed, however, it
became apparent to many neuroscientists that neuroscience lacked well-
developed methods to probe reward processing, decision-making and
social interaction. Hence, neuroscientists increasingly looked to economics,
not only for quantitative models of decision-making under uncertainty but
also for quantitative models of social interaction, particularly behavioural
game theory (Sanfey et al. 2003; King-Casas et al. 2005).
The influx of neuroscientists into neuroeconomics is a major
driving force behind its growth and may well represent the majority
of researchers who regard themselves as engaged in neuroeconomic
research. It is interesting to note that out of cognitive science grew
two overlapping but somewhat distinct fields: from the top-down grew
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cognitive neuroscience while from the bottom-up grew computational
neuroscience. The distinctions between these fields lie in differing research
agendas, an ordering of major open questions, increasing specialization,
along with sufficiency conditions on theory formation. It remains an open
question what disciplinary form neuroeconomics will take, whether it will
become an entity distinct from economics and neuroscience departments
(as was the case with cognitive science), whether it will fragment into
specializations within economics and neuroscience, or whether it will
take some other form. In this regard, it is worth noting that the goals
of neuroscientists within neuroeconomics are distinct from those of
economists for a variety of reasons, which may order their research agenda
in ways that diverge from their economic collaborators and may shape the
ultimate form neuroeconomics takes. For example, whereas economists
within neuroeconomics face the economic critique that their work is too
reductive, from the perspective of neuroscience it may not be reductive
enough, particularly work at the functional imaging level. For this reason,
many neuroscientists are eager to make links with neurophysiology
(some neuroeconomics labs currently employ both neurophysiology and
fMRI) or other lower-level methods in an effort to uncover underlying
neural mechanisms. A likely consequence of this is that the number of
animal models of economic behaviour will grow. While some economic
collaborators may embrace these developments, it may also sharpen
the external criticism of neuroeconomics as it moves further away from
traditional focuses. Relatedly, a research priority for many neuroscientists
will be to apply neuroeconomic methods to clinical populations, such
as subjects with bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and autism. Indeed, the
methods of neuroeconomics promise to shed important light on these
illnesses and disorders, and are currently being utilized among these
populations (Paulus 2007). These research priorities may not correspond
to those of economists.
For these and other reasons, neuroscientists will likely be less
concerned than their economics colleagues with the question, “is it good
economics?” For neuroscientists, their interests will lie in whether the use
of economic models and tools helps them make progress as measured by
neuroscientific standards, whether neuroscientific journals publish their
findings, and whether neuroscientific funding sources fund their research.
They may be less moved by the concern that the research meets the
expectations of economics, and this divergence may create impediments
to interdisciplinary collaboration.
IS NEUROECONOMICS A SUCCESS?
The early days of cognitive neuroscience and computational neuroscience
were, in retrospect, replete with non-starters, overly ambitious agendas,
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and unfulfilled promissory notes. It would, however, have been extremely
premature to have judged the success or failure of either new discipline
based on those early days. Likewise, it strikes me as extremely premature
to judge neuroeconomics on the basis of its current results. Rather, the
lessons of cognitive neuroscience and computational neuroscience, both
of which are unquestionably extremely productive enterprises today, is
that new interdisciplinary enterprises require a gestation period in which
investigators learn the practices, standards and vocabulary of disciplines,
and likely most importantly young investigators and graduate students
are trained in both.
It is likely that these disciplinary differences account for Harrison’s
charge that the lack of publicly available fMRI data is a ‘dark secret’
of the field. Neuroscience, like many other disciplines such as physics,
has not traditionally made raw experimental data publicly available
or, for that matter, generally available to researchers within the field.
My own speculation is that this tradition in neuroscience grew out of
neurophysiology, in which a single experiment often took years of often
heroic effort to complete, particularly if it involved primate behaviour.
Rather, like the standard in most other experimental fields, replication was
at the level of experimental parameters, not data-sharing. There have been,
however, ‘neuroinformatic’ attempts to make raw fMRI data available,
such as the fMRI Data Center (http://www.fmridc.org/f/fmridc).
Whether these are actually useful datasets is, I think, an open question,
as raw fMRI data typically requires minute details of the experimental
parameters to be useful. There is also the additional complication that to
release fMRI data would likely require a revision of standard informed
consent protocols authorizing its release even in anonymized form, as the
relationship between fMRI data and medical information continues to be
a major issue (such as incidental findings).
THE ROLE OF FMRI IN NEUROECONOMICS
There is no doubt that functional magnetic resonance imaging has played
a prominent role in the emergence of neuroeconomics. It is worth noting,
however, that in a 1988 perspective on cognitive neuroscience, Churchland
and Sejnowski’s widely reproduced figure of the spatial and temporal
resolution of the experimental techniques of cognitive neuroscience did
not include fMRI (and has been subsequently updated) (Churchland
and Sejnowski 1988). In other words, cognitive neuroscience emerged
prior to fMRI and relied instead on computational links across levels of
organization. fMRI has become a workhorse of cognitive neuroscience
because it represents the best tradeoff in terms of spatial and temporal
resolution of the (limited) non-invasive probes of human brain function.
Prior to its development, there was virtually no non-invasive probe
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for studying the human brain (electroencephalogy was available, but
had extremely poor spatial resolution). In the absence of such non-
invasive human probes, neuroscience relied on animal model systems,
which proved enormously successful for investigating such areas as the
cellular basis of learning, but for many key human domains there are
no corresponding animal models (e.g. language, strategic interaction
involving theory of mind). While fMRI has rapidly developed, it
nonetheless has basic limitations, including the temporal properties of
the haemodynamic response, its relation to underlying physiological
events, and limited spatial resolution. For these reasons, neuroscientists
typically regard it as one to be utilized as a convergent technique alongside
evidence from other neural sources, including data from animals models
and computational accounts (whereas fMRI has generated a great deal
of enthusiasm outside neuroscience, among many neuroscientists it is
considered an extremely limited tool). Increasingly, as neuroeconomics
research progresses, it will need to integrate these convergent methods
alongside fMRI, as indeed is already occurring (O’Doherty et al. 2006).
IS NEUROECONOMICS A RADICAL NEW THEORY OR AN
INCREMENTAL CHANGE?
Harrison’s interesting discussion of what constitutes an economic agent
in relation to the work of Don Ross (Ross 2005), and whether this
notion remains unitary, incorporates a dual process theory, or something
else raises an important set of issues. The explanatory vocabulary of
cognitive neuroscience, and by extension, neuroeconomics, is couched
firmly in the familiar language of “folk psychology”, whereby human
behaviour is explained in terms of intentional states, such as propositional
attitudes, and (largely) semantically coherent transitions among those
states (confirming to a principle of rationality). However, it was always
the suggestion of cognitive neuroscience that a more complete theory
may radically revise this framework. There are some strong indications
that this framework is already under pressure, as traditional categories
such as reason and emotion appear not to map onto neural systems in
an unproblematic manner, and our functional interpretation of neural
structures remains highly simplistic (Pessoa 2008). Further, it is important
to bear in mind that while neuroscience has made remarkable advances,
many of its most fundamental questions remain unanswered. To mention
just a few, the information-processing capacity of single neurons, the
nature of the neural code (how neurons code/decode information), how
information is integrated within small neighbourhoods of neurons, to say
nothing of long-range communication, remain fundamental questions.
As progress is made on these fundamental issues within neuroscience,
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it is likely that they will necessitate large-scale revision of higher-level
theories.
WHAT METHODOLOGICAL DIRECTION SHOULD
NEUROECONOMICS TAKE?
Going back to Jevons and Pareto, although both sought to establish a very
different foundation for economics, they both shared deep methodological
commitments. In particular, both adopted the common methodological
principles of their day, John Stuart Mill’s concrete deductive method,
whereby from a small set of obvious laws (Jevons’s example is that a greater
gain is preferred to a smaller one) one may deduce complex economic
phenomena. These methodological commitments are clearly in evidence
throughout the axiomatic approach of neoclassical economics.
Neuroeconomics clearly requires a distinct methodology as an
experimental discipline and one in which there as yet appears to be
few organizing principles around which neuroscience can be organized.
Harrison, based on a discussion of (Glimcher 2004), considers the
possibility that neuroeconomics adopt the top-down methodology
David Marr (1982) developed, whereby a problem is decomposed
along three distinct levels at which an information processing system
must be understood, the computational, the algorithmic, and the
implementational. These three levels also correspond to a methodology,
whereby a computational level precedes the algorithmic, and so on. Marr’s
methodology, however, grew out of many of the core commitments of
cognitive science (indeed, Marr cites Chomsky’s (1959) theory of universal
grammar as paradigmatic of the computational level). In retrospect, Marr’s
proposed methodology turned out to be a failure even within his own
area of vision (Churchland et al. 1994). From the computational level, it
seemed obvious that the computational goal of vision is to provide an
accurate internal representation of the external world. This, combined
with Marr’s modular decomposition of a task into discrete sub-tasks
(combined with Fodor’s claim that modules operate in a bottom-up
fashion), led Marr to the notion that the goal of vision was to produce
what he called a 2 1/2 - D sketch through a hierarchically organized
series of computations decomposed into sub-problems (such as shape
from shading, motion, etc.), that were subsequently integrated, and then
interfaced with visual cognition. This not only mistook the ecological goals
of vision (whereby some visual circuits bypass cortical centres altogether
and project directly to spinal cord indicating the goal of vision is not simply
to replicate the visual world, but to link visual information with adaptive
action such as predator evasion), but also neglected the non-hierarchical
nature of visual information-processing, and the non-modular nature
of cortical information-processing (Sporns and Zwi 2004). As a matter
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of discovery, then, a detailed understanding of the underlying physical
implementation is necessary for theory construction in neuroeconomics.
For these reasons, neuroeconomists should be pragmatic in the use
of available data from animal models, information regarding neural
pathways and projections, computational models of neural function,
functional imaging, and behavioural data. As cognitive science illustrates,
the major challenge facing theory formation in the neural and behavioural
sciences is that of being under-constrained by data, and it is precisely
in the capacity of cognitive neuroscience to provide convergent evidence
across multiple levels of organization that neuroeconomics has the most
promising prospects.
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